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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019
TAGS: BU TU SY ETTC MCAP MOPS PARM PINR PREL PTER MASS
SUBJECT: (S) ALERTING THE GOVERNMENTS OF BULGARIA AND
TURKEY ON POTENTIAL LME TRANSFER TO SYRIA

Classified By: EUR/PRA Acting Deputy Director Matthew Hardiman
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

SUMMARY

¶11. (S/NF) The USG has information that as of early August 2009, the Turkish firm TSS Silah Ve Savunma Sanayi Dis Ticaret Ltd. was preparing for the possible transfer of Bulgarian-origin AHM-200 helicopter mines and DVM-S remote control detonators to Syria's Ministry of Defense. A draft end-user certificate identified the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Metal Science as the source of this military hardware and the Turkish firm was brokering the deal. We also have information the Turkish arms broker was working with an official of Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) on the transfer of the Bulgarian-origin lethal military equipment (LME). Washington is concerned about the interaction between the Turkish broker and SSRC because SSRC has been subject to U.S. sanctions in the past as a known WMD and conventional arms proliferator. Washington wants to alert Bulgaria and Turkey to this activity, ask that they investigate and terminate this deal so this LME is not transferred to Syria and also possibly diverted to a terrorist group such as Hezbollah.

BACKGROUND

¶12. (S) The USG is required under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) to identify to the U.S. Congress persons and companies who have transferred goods, services or technology controlled by multilateral nonproliferation regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria. The INKSNA was enacted to discourage foreign parties from engaging in proliferation activities with Iran, North Korea, and Syria. The helicopter mines and remote control detonators are controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement. The transfer of these items would be reportable under INKSNA and sanctions could be imposed against the entities involved. Such sanctions would not be targeted at the governments involved, but at the companies responsible for such transfers.

ACTION REQUEST

¶13. (S) Department requests Embassy Sofia and Embassy Ankara approach appropriate Government of Bulgaria (GOB) and Government of Turkey (GOT) officials to deliver the talking points in paragraphs 6 and 7, respectively, and report response.

OBJECTIVES

¶4. (S) Embassy Sofia should seek to pursue the following objectives:

-- Provide GOB officials with information regarding potential transfer of Bulgarian-origin AHM-200 helicopter mines and DVM-S remote control detonators from a Bulgarian entity to a Turkish arms broker;

-- Emphasize to GOB officials that the final end-user of this LME will likely be the Government of Syria;

-- Urge the GOB to take action against this potential transfer, if in fact, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Metal Science, requests permission to export these items via Turkey to Syria;

-- Emphasize that, should we receive additional information regarding this transfer, we will provide it as expeditiously as possible.

¶5. (S) Embassy Ankara should seek to pursue the following objectives:

-- Provide GOT officials with information regarding the possible transfer of Bulgarian-origin helicopter mines and remote detonators from TSS Silah Ve Savunma Sanayi Dis Ticaret Ltd. to an official of Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center;

-- Emphasize to Turkish officials that a draft end-user certificate identified the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Metal Science as the source of the hardware;

-- Emphasize to Turkish officials that SSRC has been subject to U.S. sanctions in the past as a known WMD and conventional arms proliferator;

-- Urge the GOT to prevent any effort by this arms broker to facilitate the transfer of any LME to Syria;

-- Request the GOT to investigate this activity and share the investigation results;

-- Emphasize that, should we receive additional information regarding this transfer, we will provide it as expeditiously as possible.

TALKING POINTS

¶6. (SECRET/REL BULGARIA ONLY)

BEGIN TALKING POINTS FOR BULGARIA.

-- We have information that a Turkish arms broker, as of early August 2009, was preparing for the possible transfer of Bulgarian-origin AHM-200 helicopter mines and DVM-S remote control detonators to Syria's Ministry of Defense.

-- Our information indicates a draft end-user certificate identified the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Metal Science as the source of this military hardware and the Turkish firm TSS Silah Ve Savunma Sanayi Dis Ticaret Ltd. as the broker for the deal.

-- We are providing this information to alert you to the possibility that a Turkish arms broker may be seeking to transfer Bulgarian-origin lethal military equipment to Syria.

-- AHM-200 helicopter mines and DVM-S remote control detonators are controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement.

-- Should you receive a request for the export of these items to Syria we urge you to deny it.

-- Should the Turkish firm request permission to export these items to any end-user, we strongly urge you to closely

investigate the transfer to avoid an illicit transfer to Syria.

-- Syria provides military support to Hezbollah and as such, we are extremely concerned that any arms provided to Syria run the risk of being diverted to a terrorist group.

-- We believe that responsible members of the international community must make every effort to ensure that arms exports are conducted consistent with international norms and do not threaten regional stability.

-- We urge you to investigate the activities of this company, share with us at your earliest convenience the results of your investigation, and facilitate the immediate termination of this deal with Syria.

-- We look forward to our continued cooperation on this and other related matters.

END TALKING POINTS FOR BULGARIA.

¶7. (SECRET/REL TURKEY ONLY)

BEGIN TALKING POINTS FOR TURKEY.

-- We have information that the Turkish arms broker TSS Silah Ve Savunma Sanayi Dis Ticaret Ltd., in early August 2009, was working with an official of Syria's Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC) on the transfer of Bulgarian-origin helicopter mines and remote detonators.

-- Our information indicates a draft end-user certificate identified the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Metal Science as the source of the hardware.

-- SSRC has been subject to U.S. sanctions in the past as a known WMD proliferator and has been involved in conventional arms transfers as well.

-- Helicopter mines and remote control detonators are controlled under the Wassenaar Arrangement.

-- We are concerned about the interaction between the Turkish firm and SSRC.

-- Syria provides military support to Hezbollah and as such, we are extremely concerned that any arms provided to Syria run the risk of being diverted to a terrorist group.

-- We believe that responsible members of the international community must make every effort to ensure that arms exports are conducted consistent with international norms and do not threaten regional stability.

-- We urge you to investigate the activities of this company, share with us at your earliest convenience the results of your investigation, and facilitate the immediate termination of this deal with Syria.

-- We look forward to our continued cooperation on this and other related matters.

END TALKING POINTS FOR TURKEY.

POINT OF CONTACT

¶8. (U) Washington point of contact for follow up is Lou Ganem, ISN/CATR.

¶9. (U) Department thanks Posts for their assistance. Please slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, and T.
CLINTON